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Summary findings
It seems natural to expect the rich to oppose policies to  *  Some 72 percent of the 7,000 adults surveyed in
redistribute income from the rich to the poor, and the  October  1996 favor government action to reduce
poor  to favor such policies. But this may be too simple a  incomes of the rich, But the other 28 percent were not
model, say Ravallion and Lokshin. Expectations of futare  only the currently "rich."
welfare may come into play. Well-off people on a  *  About 85 percent of those in the poorest
downward  trajectory may well favor such policies and  consumption decile favor redistribution.  But among
poor  people on a rising trajectory may not.  those who expect their welfare to decline, support for
This resistance of upwardly mobile poor people to  redistribution is high, even among the currently "rich."
lasting redistribution  is analogous to Hirshman's  "tunnel  There is little support for redistribution  among the well-
effect," as applied to traffic stuck on a congested two-  off who expect to become even better off. Resistance is
lane road in a tunnel: People's spirits lift when traffic  greatest among those on a rising consumption path who
starts moving again; but when another  lane starts moving  expect it to continue.
and theirs doesn't,  they might grow furious and want to  *  Women tend to favor redistribution  more than men.
correct things by crossing the double line separating the  *  Those who favor redistribution include people who
two lanes.  voted communist and people who are vulnerable: the
Using Russia in the 1990s as the setting, Ravallion and  old, women, poorly educated adults, people who live in
Lokshin analyze why some people favor governmental  rural areas, people who expect to lose their jobs, and
redistribution and others do not and whether there is a  people who do not think the government cares about
"tunnel effect." They find that:  them.
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for their comments.1.  Introduction
One expects that policies which redistribute incomes from the rich to the poor will be
favored by the poor and opposed by the rich. Such an alignment of interests seems natural, given
their respective gains and losses.
But this may be too simple a model. Govemmental redistributions are not normally one-
off events, so expectations of future welfare will come into play. Currently poor people on a
rising trajectory may well oppose redistribution, and currently well-off people on a downward
trajectory may well favor it. There may also be heterogeneity in tastes for inequality, or in
beliefs about the costs and benefits of redistribution, or about the government's ability to
redistribute in a predictable way.  For these and possibly other reasons, not all currently poor
people appear to favor redistribution, and not all currently rich people oppose it.
A better understanding of these issues can throw light on a number of issues concerning
the political-economy of redistributive policy and the causes of inequality. The prospect of
upward mobility has been used to explain why rising inequality might be tolerated in rapidly
developing countries. Albert Hirshman dubbed this the "tunnel effect":
"Suppose  that I drive through a two-lane tunnel, both lanes going in the same direction,  and
run into a serious traffic  jam. No car moves in either lane as far as I can see (which is not
very far). I am in the left lane and feel dejected. After a while the cars in the right lane begin
to move. Naturally my spirits lift considerably,  for I know the jam has been broken and that
my lane's turn to move will surely come at any moment now. Even though I still sit still, I
feel much better off than before because of the expectation  that I shall soon be on the move"
(Hirshman, 1973, p. 545).
In the spirit of Hirshman's idea, recent theoretical work has shown how past mobility
experiences can have persistent effects on attitudes to redistribution at given current incomes,
allowing a deeper understanding of redistributive politics (Piketty, 1995). Upward mobility can
2also explain why some currently poor people resist lasting redistributions, and (hence) why we
do not see more pressure for redistribution in democracies where (given that income distribution
is skewed) the median voter will have an income below the mean; Bdnabou and Ok (1998)
provide a formal model of such behavior, which they term the "prospect for upward mobility
hypothesis".2
Of course, by the same token, the prospect of falling income can promote a desire for
redistribution amongst the currently non-poor. Continuing Hirshman's analogy to a congested
tunnel:
"But suppose  that the expectation i:i  disappointed  and only the right lane keeps moving: in
that case I, along with my left lane cosufferers,  shall suspect foul play, and many of us will at
some point become quite furious and ready to correct manifest injustice by taking direct
action (such as illegally crossing  the double line separating  the two lanes)" (Hirschman,
1973,  p. 545).
The perceived role of governmental redistribution of current incomes as a forn  of insurance
could well be a strong motive in some settings. Suppose that income redistribution by
government is seen as a safety net to protect against adverse shocks. One can then expect that
demand for redistribution by government will be lower in a socially cohesive setting in which
reciprocal relationships (though possibly unequal ones, such as based on patronage) offer
security, than in an individualistic, socially fragmented, one. 3 A further implication is that in
settings in which there are significant down-side risks one might well find strong support
2  There is a literature  in political  science  and political  sociology  on the effects  of actual  and
perceived  social  mobility  on redistributive  politics;  for discussion  and references  see Piketty  (1995).
3  For example,  there is evidence  that private  redistribution  is more active  in rural  than urban
areas  of developing  countries;  see Ravallion  and Dearden  (1988)  using  data for Indonesia.
3amongst currently non-poor people for programs targeted to the poor. 4
This paper attempts to understand why some people favor governmental redistribution
and others do not, and (in particular) whether there is a "tunnel effect". We hope to throw light
on a number of questions, including: Do the currently poor favor inequality-reducing
redistribution, and the current rich oppose it? Do people expect redistribution to be persistent
and so think inter-temporally in deciding how much they want governments to intervene in the
distribution of income? In particular, are those who expect to be better off in the future less
inclined to support redistribution, and (reversing the argument) do perceptions of vulnerability to
down-side income risk stimulate demand for redistribution? And how do perceptions of social
exclusion affect the demand for redistribution? For example, do people who feel politically
marginalized have a higher demand for redistribution at any given level of current income?
Russia in the 1990s is an interesting setting for examining these issues. After the breakup
of the communist system and movement toward a free market economy, inequality of incomes
increased substantially in Russia.  Between 1992 and 1996, the Gini index of income inequality
is estimated to have risen from 0.41 to 0.49 (Lokshin and Popkin, 1998). Subjective assessments
of psychological well-being suggest rising dissatisfaction in the 1990s (Rose and McAllister,
1996; Ravallion and Lokshin, 1999). Early post-reform expectations were disappointed for
many. The survey data we will use in this paper indicate that between 1992 and 1996 the
proportion of Russian adults who thought that their family's life would get better over the next
4  For example,  it has been  argued  that the broad base of polictical  support  that one finds for
some  safety  net programs  in poor  rural  economies  derives  from insurance  motives  for redistribution
(Ravallion,  1991).
412 months dropped from 55% (of 11,300 sampled adults) to 41% (of 7,000 adults). The left lane
was clearly not moving for the bulk of Russians in this period. But there was a moving right lane;
a small minority of people were seeing rising living standards. Our data (discussed below)
indicate that 8.4% of adults saw real consuraption gains for their families in both 1995
(compared to 1994) and 1996 (1995).
We will use an unusually rich household survey for Russia in 1996. The survey included
standard socio-economic data on incomes, consumptions, demographics, education attainments
and so on.  In addition, the survey included a range of more subjective questions on perceptions
of welfare and how it is expected to change over time. It also included a question on whether
each sampled adult was for or against governmental efforts to redistribute income; in particular
respondents were asked: "Do you agree or disagree that the government must restrict the income
of the rich?"  We will call this the "restrict the rich?" question (RRQ). 72% of adults answered
that they were in favor of restricting incomes of the rich in 1996.
The RRQ was not asked in previous survey rounds, so we cannot say if the proportion
increased during the 1990s. However, since the RRQ was asked in a comprehensive multi-
purpose socio-economic survey, we can use our data to explore the reasons why some people
favored restricting incomes of the rich and others did not.  In particular, we can see how
expectations interacted with current living standards and other factors. We do not think it
plausible that there is sufficient mobility that the bulk of the poorest decile (say) in Russia would
oppose reducing incomes of the rich because they think they will become rich in the foreseeable
future. As we shall see, there is little resistence to redistribution amongst the poorest in Russia.
However, it is more interesting to look closily at how the currently "rich" feel in this setting. We
5shall show that currently well-off individuals who expected their welfare to improve tended to
oppose redistribution, while those who feared decline favored it.
The next section outlines a rudimentary model of preferences for governmental
redistribution. Our data are described in section 3. Section 4 presents our results for Russia.
Section 5 concludes.
2.  Preferences for Redistribution in Theory
A natural interpretation of the "restrict the rich?" question is that some form of tax is
contemplated, to be levied on incomes above some level. 5 That level, and what would be done
with the revenue, are both left to the imagination of the respondent. We assume that individual
respondents hold expectations about the likely outcome for them personally. In particular, we
assume that a respondent who considered herself poor anticipates a non-negative financial gain
from restricting incomes of the rich. With certainty, the person who considers himself rich
expects a financial loss.
Utility also depends on uncertain future incomes, and governmental redistribution alters
the probability distribution of future incomes. For this reason, the function relating utility to
current income will not be the same with redistribution as without it.  We can also expect the
utility function to vary with a vector of other variables, x, including individual and household
characteristics that might affect expected utility at given current income. These can be interpreted
5  One interpretation  is that a 100%  marginal  tax is to be imposed,  implying  that income  of the
rich is bounded  above. However,  this is probably  too literal,  and we suspect  that many  respondents  to the
Russian survey  would  have in mind  a high (but not necessarily  100%)  tax on (observed)  incomes  above
some level.
6as variables affecting the demand for governmental redistribution as insurance, independently of
the implications for current incomes.
The expected tax can be positive or negative and we assume that it is strictly increasing in
current income y.  The tax can also be a function of x which includes variables that affect the
expected tax at given current income.
For the status quo (without further governmental redistribution), we assume that no
tax/transfer is expected. Taxes and transfers made for other purposes (including existing
redistributive interventions) are taken as subsumed in incomes as defined here.
Expected utility without income reclistribution  by the government is the sum of current
utility (known with certainty) and expected future utility, where that expectation is formed over
an uncertain distribution of future income. Utility without redistribution is then:
u(y,  x) =ty,  x) + Jfr, x)WdH(,  x)  (1)
wheref is the felicity function and H is the distribution of future income. We make the standard
assumption thatf  is twice-differentiable, strictly increasing and concave in y.
With redistribution, there is uncertainty about what tax will be imposed, as well as the
uncertainty about future income. We assume that the uncertainty about the tax is additive. The
tax on someone with income y and attributes x is r(y, x)+" where  i is the unknown random
variable. Redistribution also changes the distribution of the uncertain variable(s) influencing
future incomes. Utility with redistribution is then given by:
v(y - r(y, x), x) = f fLv - xty, x) - ji,  x]dG(p,  x)
+ f  [  - (,  x) - .,  X]dG( i, x)dH*(,  x)  (2)
7where HI is the cumulative distribution function of future income with redistribution.
The tax is assumed to be positive on all incomes above  y' which defines a person's
perception of who is "rich". If income is belowy* then the person expects to gain financially as a
result of the redistribution. The value of y* for any given x is unique and is given implicitly by
r(y*,  x)+g=O. (Note that y'  is a function of x.)
The other factor determining expected utility with redistribution is the probability
distribution of future income. If the redistribution is not expected to alter that distribution
(H=hI)  then u(y', x) = v(y', x); a person who does not expect to incur any tax (positive or
negative), and does not think there will be any effect on the distribution from which his future
incomes will be drawn, will be indifferent to the proposed redistribution.  If the distribution of
future income with redistribution is preferred (not preferred) then u(y', x) < (>) v(y&,  x).
Who will prefer restricting incomes of the rich? The utility gain is:
g(y,  X)  = Vy  - T(y,  X),  X]  - U(y, X)  (3)
It is clear that this is non-negative for all y< y  if restricting incomes of the rich is perceived to be
desirable in its own right (i.e., as long as v(y,  x) 2 u(y, x)). Of course, finding that people who
perceive their own income to be low are in favor of redistribution does not reveal that they care
about distribution per se. More revealing are the answers given at high incomes.  If g(y, x) > 0 for
any income y > y  then the expected distribution is preferred even though own income falls.
How does support for restricting the incomes of the rich vary with income? On
differentiating (3) with respect to y we have:
g,(y,  x) = vyv  - T(y,  x),  x][I  - ry(,  x)]  -fy,  x)  (4)
8where
v,yW  - T~, x), x)  f fLv - r(,  x) - [, x]dG(p.,  x)  (5)
It can be seen that gy(y,  x) < (>) 0 as 1 < (>  ) ry(y,  x) +fy(v, x)lvy[y -r(y, x), x]. The source of
ambiguity in the effect of income on support for redistribution lies in the variation in the
marginal utility of income. A sufficient condition for support for redistribution to fall as income
increases ( gy < 0) is that redistribution lowers the marginal utility of income i.e., vy4y  - r(y, x), x]
< u,(y, x). This is not, however, an intuitively plausible condition at all income levels; amongst
those who expect to be donors one might find a sufficiently high marginal utility of income after
the redistribution to yield gy  > 0. In the special case in which the tax is certain (ji=O),  it is readily
verified that:
gy@* x) = -f(y*,  X).r,(y,  x) < 0  (6)
How does preference for redistribution vary with x? Differentiating (3):
gx(y, x)  =  - r(y, x), .r],r(y, x) + v,[y - r(y, x), x] - ux(y,  x)  (7)
Consider any variable in x that increases the expected tax - call this a "tax-attracting attribute". If
the utility function takes the additively separable form such that the direct marginal utility of x is
unaffected by redistribution and neither the uncertainty about the tax nor that about future
income are affected by x, then it is plain that an increase in any tax-attracting attribute will
reduce the desire for redistribution. However, the more general non-separable case is ambiguous.
A sufficient condition for a higher tax-attracting attribute to reduce the desire for redistribution is
that the direct marginal utility of that attribute is lower with redistribution than without it. The
necessary condition for a tax-attracting attribute to increase the desire for redistribution is that the
9direct marginal utility of that attribute is higher with redistribution.
The main task of the empirical work to follow is to assess why some people support the
expected redistribution and others do not.  The above discussion helps motivate a simple
empirical model. Let R be a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the person is opposed to
redistribution and 0 if she is in favor. Then we have:
R = 1  [g(y, x)>O]  (8)
where 1  [.1 is the indicator function. One can estimate this as a probit, assuming that g(y, x) is
linear in parameters and includes a normally distributed error term.
3.  Data
It is clearly difficult to formulate simple yet revealing questions about subtle aspects of
personal attitudes to governmental redistribution. The RRQ does not directly posit any specific
redistributive tax scheme.  That would have entailed a more complex question, which surveyors
might reasonably have been wary of. The RRQ does, however, have the advantage for our
purpose that it pins down one key aspect of the idea of "redistribution", namely that the "rich" are
the donors; by contrast, asking a question such as "do you agree or disagree that the govemrnent
should redistribute incomes?" would leave open who would be the donor.
Our data on responses to the RRQ come from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring
Survey (RLMS).'  RLMS is based on the first nationally representative sample of several
6  This is a collaborative  effort  of the University  of North  Carolina  at Chapel  Hill and (for the
survey rounds  we are using)  the Institute  of Sociology,  the Institute  of Nutrition  (Russian  Academy  of
Medical Sciences)  and Paragon  Research  International  Inc. Financing  was provided  by the World  Bank
and USAID.  The RLMS  website  gives details  on the survey  and how  to obtain  the data at no cost. The
WWW  address  for the RLMS  is: http://www.cpc.unc.  edulprojects/rlms/rlms_home.  html.
10thousand households across the Russian Federation. The survey comprises seven rounds
spanning September 1992 to October 1996. This paper is based on data from the October 1996
round of the survey which is the only one to ask the RRQ. The households in the last round were
also surveyed in two previous rounds, and we will use some data from those rounds, as discussed
later.  The 1996 sample includes 3557 households and 10035 individuals.  The RRQ was only
asked of adults, giving us a sample size of 6808.  72% of sampled adults responded that they are
in favor of governmental efforts to reduce the incomes of the rich.
Responses the RRQ might reflect expectations of current financial gain or loss; or they
may stem from envy of the rich, or concern for the welfare of the non-rich, or some combination
of the two.  However, the RLMS is a large integrated survey on living standards. By exploiting
this fact, we hope to reveal whether there is support for governmental redistribution beyond
motives of financial self-interest and what ;factors  explain why some people support
redistribution and others do not.  Although the survey did not ask whether the respondent
considered herself a likely loser financially from policies which restrict incomes of the rich, it did
include an unusually wide range of both otjective and subjective (self-rated) indicators of who
might consider themselves rich and what expectations they hold for future welfare.
Primary sample units (PSU) for the survey were drawn from a list of more than 2000
raions (counties). The PSU's were allocated into 38 equal size strata based on geographical,
ethnic and other factors. One raion was selected from each stratum, with probability proportional
to size. Within each raion, an equal number of households has been interviewed. We use these
raions as a geographical unit in the analysis.
In adjusting for cost-of-living differences (regionally and over time) we have used the
11official poverty lines of the Russian Federation (Popkin et al. 1993). These use a food basket
developed for a set of age-gender categories. The cost-of-food basket calculations were based on
dietary intake requirements for each age-gender grouping. Thus, each age and gender group has
its specific poverty line which is used to construct a household's poverty line according to the
demographic composition of the household. Regional differences in prices were captured by
using region-specific price information.
The income data are measured as monthly household incomes from all sources. This
includes: wage income from both main and additional  jobs, social security transfers, private
transfers, in-kind income, and income from home production.
However, there are reasons to doubt that this income measure is a good indicator of
current economic welfare. There are transient effects on incomes, and measurement errors. An
alternative, and arguably better, indicator of current income available in the data set is the real
value of household consumption (normalized by the household-specific poverty lines described
above). This includes cash expenditures and imputed expenditures for the goods and services
that have been produced by the household itself. (The value of home produced food is calculated
as a product of the quantity of each food item produced and its prevailing regional market price.)
To attempt to further reduce attenuation bias due to measurement error in consumption we take a
two year mean (over the 1996 and 1995 survey rounds). 7
To attempt to capture the difference between households that have been on a rising
7  We  tested  the alternative  specifications  in which  we used instead  either  the 1996  consumption
or income.  These  were still significant  with the expected  signs.  However  (consistent  with attenuation  bias
due to measurement  error), the coefficients  were lower  (in absolute  value) and less significant  than if we
used the two-year  mean of consumption.
12welfare trajectory and those on a falling one we constructed two dummy variables. The first takes
the value one if real consumption was higher in 1996 than in 1995 and higher in 1995 than 1994.
The other takes the value one if consumption was lower in 1996 than in 1995 and also lower in
1995 than in 1994.
The survey also included an unusually rich set of attitudinal questions.  One of these
provides an indicator of perceived current economic welfare. In particular, respondents were
asked to say how they rated their own economic welfare on a nine rung ladder from "poor" to
"rich". We call this "subjective economic welfare".
We will also include subjective indicators of vulnerability, of which the best in the survey
is probably the question "do you think that in the next 12 months you and your family will live
better than today, or worse".  This will allow us to test whether those who feel vulnerable to
falling welfare will have a higher demand for redistribution, given other variables, including
current and past economic welfare.
A potentially interesting indicator of perceived social exclusion in the survey is the
answer to a question, "do you agree or disagree that the people who govern the country do not
care what will become of people like you?". This was asked of each adult. We will test whether
those who feel socially excluded in this way will be more disposed toward redistribution as a
means of insurance.
We also include a control for political preference, namely whether or not the person voted
for the Communist Party (CP). On expects this to entail a greater demand for redistribution.
Table 1 provides self-explanatory summary data.
134.  Results
Table  2 gives  the sample  proportions  who  supported  restricting  incomes  of the rich by
deciles  of respondents  ranked  by their  two year  mean household  consumptions  (normalized  by
the household  specific  poverty  lines). Figure 1 presents  the same  basic  information  in the form
of smoothed  scatter  plots of the answers  to the RRQ  against  the same  measure of consumption. 8
There is a tendency  for support  for redistribution  to fall as consumption  rises, though support
remains strong  even amongst  families  with the highest  consumptions  in the sample.
The table and figure  also give  the results  stratified  according  to whether  the respondent
thought  welfare  was going  to increase  or decrease  (the category  of "no change"  is left out of the
figure  to make it readable).  We see that  amongst  people  who  expect  welfare  to fall, there is very
high support  for restricting  incomes  of the rich,  and the support  is affected  little by current  level
of living. By contrast,  support  for redistribution  is lower  than average  amongst  those who expect
welfare  to rise, and is sharply  attenuated  by higher  current  levels  of living  within this group.
Table  3 shows  how  the preference  for redistribution  varies  with the aforementioned
indicator  of subjective  economic  welfare. 9 We find an almost  monotonic  decrease  in preference
for restricting  incomes  of the rich as the subjective  perception  of welfare  improves. Yet it
remains  that amongst  the richest  2% of persons  in terms of their self perception  of welfare
(namely  those  putting  themselves  on rungs 7-9 of the ladder)  44% said  they were in favor  of
restricting  incomes  of the rich.
8  We used  the  program  for locally-weighted  smoothed  scatter  plots  in STATA  6.0  (the  KSM
command).
9 We  have  aggregated  categories  8 and  9 into  one,  since  only  six people  in the sample  said  they
were  in  category  9; two  of  then  favored  restricting  incomes  of the  rich.
14When we stratify according to whether or not the person thinks welfare will increase over
the next 12 months we find a much stronger "income effect" for those who expect their welfare
to increase (Table 3).  While 72% of the whole sample favor restricting incomes of the rich, this
falls to only 12.5% for adults who have the highest self-assessed economic welfare and expect
this to improve over the next year. Amongst those who expect to be better off in the future, the
subjective welfare indicator reveals a much sharper rate of decline in support for redistribution as
welfare rises than does the objective indicator based on actual consumption.  In contrast to the
weak support for redistribution amongst those who are relatively well off and expect to be even
better off in the future, we find that 88% of those who put themselves on the lowest rung of the
welfare ladder, and who expect their welfare to fall, favor restricting incomes of the rich.
To allow for other "non-income" J-actors  influencing the demand for redistribution, we
estimated a multivariate model of answers to the RRQ. The expected utility gain from
govermmental  redistribution for respondentj (=1,..n) is:
gyj,  xj) = a + pyj + Axj + zj  (9)
where E.  is a norrnally distributed innovation error with distribution function F.  To allow
maximum flexibility in how differences in expectations affect the g(y 1, xj) we stratify the model
according to whether or not the respondent expects welfare to increase or not.
The RRQ was asked of individuals and there is likely to be an unobserved household-
specific effect (if only because of selective sorting according to preferences, though there may
also be household-level omitted variables.) To allow this possibility we make the testable
assumption that Fj  includes a normally-distributed household-specific random effect vu  (correlated
between respondents within a given household but independent between households). A
15likelihood ratio test of the null that p - var(u)/(1+var(u))  = 0 can then be used to test our
specification against an ordinary probit.
Table 4 gives the random-effects probit estimates for the binary response based on (8)
and (9) i.e., the probability of g>O,  which is given by F(-F). In addition to consumption
expenditure (two year mean, deflated by date and region-specific poverty lines), we include a
number of demographic variables and variables reflecting political preferences and attitudes to
the government, as indicated in the table.'0 We give results for the three sub-samples defined
according to expectations of whether welfare will increase, stay the same, or fall. In all cases we
can we reject the null that p=O,  favoring our choice of the random effects probit.
We find a strong effect of current consumption on demand for redistribution amongst
those who think the welfare will increase or stay the same, but no such effect amongst those who
think things will get worse. The fear of falling welfare promotes a desire for redistribution even
amongst the currently well off. There is a very strong negative effect of a rising trajectory of
consumption but only amongst those who expect things to (continue to) improve.
There are also a number of significant factors which enhance the preference for
governmental redistribution. These include the number of pensioners in the family, living in a
rural area, less education, being female, being married, whether the respondent also thought that
the government cares about "people like you", whether the respondent voted communist in the
last election, whether the respondent expects to be better off in the future, and whether the
10  To allow  for the possibility  that different  income  sources  might attract  different  taxes, we also
tested a model with income  shares  by components.  To allow for the possibility  that incomes  are not
pooled,  we tested a model with individual  incomes  by source.  Neither  sets of variables  were individually
or jointly significant.
16respondent fears losing his or her job.  The coefficients on these variables tend to be quite stable
between the three regressions.
The impact of some of the attitudinal variables is particularly strong. A person who does
not fear losing her job is less likely to favor redistribution (though this is not significant amongst
those who think their welfare will fall in the near future). A person who thinks that "the
government cares about people like him" is less in favor of redistribution.
It is striking how virtually all of the non-income indicators can be interpreted as
suggesting that expected future income gains (losses) diminish (increase) the demand for
redistribution at given current income. And many of these effects are both statistically and
quantitatively significant. Taken over all, these results are highly suggestive that support for
redistribution is stronger amongst those who fear that their welfare will fall, and weaker amongst
those who do not.
The subjective welfare indicators do not emerge as significant predictors, controlling for
the other variables.  We saw in Table 2 that there is a marked subjective welfare gradient in
support for redistribution amongst those who expect welfare to rise.  This is clearly because of
the control variables that are correlated with subjective welfare.
The results are also suggestive that perceived social exclusion matters to the demand for
income redistribution. It does not seem plauisible  that a person who thinks "the government does
not care about people like me" would expect to gain financially if the government restricted
incomes of the rich. If so then, the fact that such people so strongly favor redistribution must be
because the marginal disutility of being socially excluded in this way is lower with redistribution.
(In terms of equation 7, consider an attribute that increases desire for redistribution but is not tax-
17attracting. Then marginal direct utility of that attribute must be higher with redistribution than
without it.)
5.  Conclusions
It is plain from our investigation that attitudes to governmental redistribution in Russia
are driven by more than whether or not a person thinks he or she would currently gain or lose.
72% of the nearly 7000 adults surveyed in October 1996 indicated that they favor governmental
action to reduce incomes of the rich.  But the remaining 28% were clearly not just the currently
"rich" in any obvious sense.
The currently poor do tend to be very supportive of the redistribution proposed in the
survey question, with about 85% of those in the poorest consumption decile favoring it. This is
not too surprising; few of the poorest could reasonably expect to become "rich".  More revealing
are the answers given by high consumption groups, and people who believe they have a high
economic welfare.  For them, expectations of future welfare clearly play an important role.
Amongst those who think that their welfare is going to fall in the near future, support for
redistribution is high, even amongst the currently "rich".  And there is relatively little support
amongst families that are currently well off and who expect to see their welfare rise over time.
Amongst those who expect things to get better, there is a pronounced current income effect
attenuating the desire for redistribution. For example, there is negligible support amongst those
who perceive themselves to be well-off and who expect to be better off in the future. Resistance
to redistribution is strongest amongst those who have been on a rising consumption path over
recent years, and expect this to continue.
18Women tend to favor redistribution naore  than men (except amongst respondents who
expect their welfare will fall). The old favor it more than the young.  Strong correlations with a
number of attitudinal variables are indicated. Those who voted communist are significantly more
disposed toward governmental action to restrict the incomes of the rich. Those who think the
government does not cares about them are more likely to favor restricting incomes of the rich.
Virtually all of our results on these "non-income" attributes can be interpreted as effects
of some form of inter-temporal reasoning about future gains and losses from sustained
governmental redistribution. Those living in rural areas, the old, women, poorly educated adults,
those who expect their welfare to fall, or to lose their job and those who do not think the
government cares about them, can all be expected to feel vulnerable in one way or another.
Our empirical results are consistent with our formalization of Hirschman's idea of a
"tunnel effect", whereby attitudes to redistribution depend on expectations of future mobility - in
both directions. The Russian tunnel effect in the 1  990s entailed that only a small minority of
people  experienced or expected rising living standards, while the bulk suffered or feared
contraction. This situation appears to have fueled a strong demand for redistribution.  This exists
even amongst many of those who are currently well off, but who fear for the future. By contrast
there is negligible demand for redistribution amongst the well off who are on a rising trajectory.
A corollary of the importance of risk in the demand for redistribution is that adverse welfare
effects of vulnerability, such as due to social exclusion, are exacerbated by income inequality.
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21Table 1: Summary statistics, Russia 1996
Variable  Mean  Standard  error
Current welfare
Log of household expenditure normalized by the poverty line (1995-96)  1.497  1.263
Household belongs to lower five ranks (dummy)  0.936  0.244
Household belongs to the 6th highest rank (dummy)  0.044  0.204
Household belongs to the 7th highest  Tank  (dummy)  0.016  0.126
Household belongs to the 8th highest rank (dummy)  0.005  0.065
Attitudinal variables
Not afraid of losing job (dummy)  0.070  0.256
Concerned about providing basic needs in the future (dummy)  0.550  0.497
Government does not care about me (dummy)  0.432  0.495
Government cares about me (dummy)  0.141  0.348
Participation in the last presidential elections (dummy)  0.718  0.450
Voted for the communist party candidate (dummy)  0.243  0.429
Household demographic characteristics
Share of pensioners  0.258  0.363
Share of children younger 18 years old  0.210  0.210
Log of household size  1.100  0.487
Geographic characteristics
Household resides in rural area (dummy)  0.266  0.442
Household resides in urban area (dummy)  0.654  0.476
Household resides in metropolitan area (dummy)  0.080  0.271
Poverty rate in the area  0.251  0.150
Individual characteristics
High school diploma or less (dummy)  0.153  0.360
Technical vocational education (dummy)  0.531  0.499
University degree or higher (dummy)  0.302  0.459
Male (dummy)  0.439  0.496
Age-gender interaction  18.161  23.401
Pensioner (dummy)  0.271  0.445
Married (dummy)  0.634  0.481
Single (dummy)  0.172  0.378
Divorced (dummy)  0.078  0.268
Widowed (dummy)  0.116  0.320
Age in years  43.416  18.148
22Table  2: Redistribution  preference  by level of subjective  welfare
Self-rated ranking  Number of  In favor of  % in favor of restricting incomes of the rich,
in terms of  persons in  restricl:ing  stratified by expectations about welfare over the
economic welfare  sample  incomes of  next 12 months
the rich (%)  Better off  No Change  Worse off
I (poorest)  900  82.2  66.6  77.1  87.7
2  1069  83.5  59.6  80.9  89.4
3  1506  74.,2  50.6  78.0  81.3
4  1350  70.5  52.2  71.1  82.7
5  1414  63.9  46.1  76.4  79.8
6  287  53.3  39.6  60.0  77.5
7  110  46.4  20.8  39.2  73.3
8 + 9 (richest)  29  34.4  12.5  ---  50.0
Total  6665  72.:3  49.6  75.1  84.5
Table  3: Redistribution  preference  by consumption  decile
Average  Number of  In favor of  % in favor of restricting incomes of the rich,
expenditure  persons in  restricting  stratified by expectations about welfare over the
deciles  sample  incomes of  next 12 months
the ric)i  Better off  No Change  Worse off
1  734  84.6  63.5  88.7  86.9
2  735  83.4  52.5  88.4  87.1
3  734  79.0  63.6  78.3  88.6
4  735  75.7  49.5  78.2  84.8
5  734  71.:3  46.2  73.8  80.4
6  734  74.5  57.9  74.9  85.3
7  735  69.1  50.4  66.1  80.7
8  734  68.2  38.1  68.9  83.8
9  735  67.3  46.9  67.2  82.7
10  734  63.1  44.4  61.8  82.3
Total  7344  73.6  46.9  75.1  84.5
23Table 4: Multivariate models of preference for redistribution
Expect  to  No  change  Expect  to
live  better  live  worse
Variable  coefficient stand.  coefficient  stand. coefficient  stand.
error  error  error
Current  welfare
Log of total average household expenditure  -0.407**  0.169  -0.424***  0.119  -0.189  0.123
Household belongs to the 6th highest rank  -0.223  0.272  -0.298  0.228  0.004  0.407
Household  belongs to the 7th highest rank  0.281  0.360  -0.912**  0.393  0.291  0.955
Household belongs to the 8th highest rank  -1.412  1.083  -1.177  1.203  -0.302  1.024
Consumption  trajectories
Increase in consumption in all years  -0.951***  0.282  -0.158  0.179  -0.068  0.231
Decline in consumption in all years  -0.083  0.218  0.167  0.143  -0.020  0.155
Attitudinal  variables
Not at all afraid of losingjob  -0.461*  0.261  -0.390**  0.185  -0.249  0.234
Concerned about providing basic needs  0.620***  0.187  0.142  0.111  0.448***  0.136
Government does not care about me  0.243  0.194  0.102  0.117  0.251  *  0.132
Government cares about me  -0.501**  0.208  -0.443**  0.142  -0.406*  0.211
Participated the last presidential election  -0.238  0.193  -0.029  0.130  -0.062  0.154
Voted for the communist party candidate  0.71 I**  0.305  0.363**  0.147  0.200  0.145
Household  demographic  characteristics
Share of pensioners  0.793  0.555  0.390  0.297  0.530*  0.327
Share of children younger 18 years old  0.578  0.505  0.377  0.362  -0.287  0.435
Log of household size  -0.045  0.067  -0.042  0.049  0.057  0.061
Geographic  characteristics
Household resides in the rural area  0.659**  0.263  0.562***  0.162  0.127  0.176
Household resides in the metropolitan area  -0.143  0.281  -0.513**  0.232  -0.124  0.301
Proportion of poor households in the area  -0.191  0.808  -0.121  0.496  0.355  0.564
Individual  characteristics
High school diploma or less  0.413*  0.280  0.386**  0.184  0.476**  0.206
Technical vocational education  0.202  0.269  0.349*  0.182  0.249  0.199
Gender (male=l)  -0.799**  0.396  -0.512**  0.253  -0.567  0.367
Age in years  0.036**  0.013  0.031***  0.008  0.020**  0.008
Age-gender interaction  0.014  0.011  0.003  0.006  0.013*  0.008
Pensioner  -0.501  0.517  0.007  0.284  -0.001  0.294
Married  -0.821**  0.278  -0.347**  0.188  -0.278  0.238
24Table  4 continued,
Exipect  to live  better  No change  Expect to live  worse
Variable  Coeff.  S.E.  Coeff.  S.E.  Coeff.  S.E
Divorced  -1.060**  0.410  -0.337  0.239  0.010  0.311
Widowed  -0.344  0.574  -0.370  0.311  -0.071  0.324
On unpaid  leave  0.030  0.392  -0.014  0.276  0.063  0.268
Unemployed  -0.201  0.292  -0.072  0.224  0.094  0.272
Constant  -0.375  0.576  0.027  0.402  -0.216  0.512
Proportion  of total  variance  contributed  by  0.531  0.108  0.584  0.055  0.628  0.063
the panel-level  variance  (p)
Likelihood  ratio test of p=O
.f/Probability  >j  18.94/0.0000  106.12/0.0000  62.74/0.000
Note: The following  categories  are used as a reference:  subjective  household  income  rank  - households  in  the
lowest  five ranks;  consumption  trajectories  - mixed  trajectories;  whether  government  cares  about people  - category
that  government  does not care (weak  statement);  type  of residence  - households  in urban  areas  of Russia;  education
- university  degree or higher;  marital  status  - single.
25Figure  1: Preference  for redistribution  against log consumption
normalized  by the poverty line (two year mean)
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